

2024 European Elections and the ‘New Europe’ of the Far-Right

SELÇEN ÖNER¹

Abstract. In this chapter, the idea of a ‘New Europe’ of the far-right is discussed. Instead of leaving the EU, most of the far-right leaders have emphasised the goal of ‘Europe of Nations’, especially since the 2019 European elections. In this chapter firstly, their ‘Parochial Europe’ vision will be analysed. Secondly, the influential factors for collaboration between far-right parties before the 2024 European elections will be evaluated. While the migration issue brings together far-right parties and even centre-right, especially after the ‘migration crisis’, their foreign policy orientations after Russia invades Ukraine and their relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, are the main dividing lines of the far-right parties before the 2024 European elections. Lastly, the implications of the result of the European elections and the challenges of the ‘new Europe’ vision of the far-right for the future of the EU will be discussed.

Keywords: Far-Right; European Elections; ‘New Europe’; European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR); ‘Europe of Nations’.

¹ Selcen Öner, Bahcesehir University (Turkey). Email address: selcen.oner@bau.edu.tr

Introduction

In the 21st century, the world has been facing increasing global challenges, including the financial crisis, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine War, the Israel-Palestine conflict, technological transformation and the challenges of AI. The European Union (EU) has been influenced by these global challenges as well. In addition to these, the EU has been influenced particularly by the migration crisis and Brexit as well in the last decade. After facing these multiple crises, while mainstream parties cannot find solutions to many problems that have emerged, the far-right parties have used this atmosphere to increase their influence in European politics by finding new scapegoats, rather than finding solutions.

After the 2nd World War, most of the extreme right parties disappeared, they had limited success or went underground. In the 1970s with the third wave of radical right parties, radical right became an important political force. At the beginning of the 21st century, a radical right party could be seen in the majority of West European countries. However, unlike Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties, a European alliance among the radical right has been usually not sustainable (Zaslove, 2004, p. 62).

Despite the rise of several far-right parties since the 1980s in some Western European countries, it took almost 20 years until they could be accepted as coalition partners by mainstream parties, especially by the conservative or populist right. The participation of far-right in coalition governments which is a crucial step in the ‘mainstreaming’ process of the far-right, mostly occurred since the 2000s (Minkenberg, 2013, pp. 17-18).

In this chapter, the concept of ‘far-right’ is used which is more comprehensive and refers to both the political parties

from the Identity and Democracy (ID) group and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) in the European Parliament (EP) before the 2024 European elections. After the elections new far-right party groups were formed in the EP.

The electoral strength, parliamentary presence and government participation of far-right parties have played an important role in 'reshaping the distribution of power in European politics'. Wagner and Meyer (2017, pp. 84-85) found empirical support for a rightward shift in European party systems. Mainstream right and left parties have moved to the right. The far-right parties have been in coalition governments, such as in Austria and Italy (Mudde, 2013: 1-19). As Oesch and Rennwald (2018, p. 783) argue, in the 21st century bipolar competition is becoming tripolar. Two dominant party poles of the 20th century are challenged by the third pole which is far-right.

Wagner and Meyer (2017, pp. 91-92) analysed the far-right parties in 17 Western European countries since 1980. They found out that over time all party types have shifted towards 'the authoritarian end of the policy scale'. Moreover, there is a small difference between centre-right and centre-left parties. This process is referred to as a 'right turn', as both mainstream parties and the far-right have gradually shifted to the right.

The far-right parties did not begin as parties that supported conservative positions on issues such as family, abortion and religion. However, they have evolved towards this direction. They claim that Christian values are the core principles of civil society and European civilization. The leaders of these parties mostly think that their support comes mostly from the voters who have more traditional values, especially in terms of family and religion. For that reason, anti-abortion, anti-LGBT, and pro-family policies have become the main focus points (Zaslove, 2004, pp. 74) for many far-right parties.

On the other hand, the European level is considered “both as an independent variable of party change and as an additional area in which parties pursue domestic policy goals and strategies” (Almeida, 2010, pp. 237-238). As Givens (2005, pp. 18-20) argues, despite differences in their historical development during the 1980s and 1990s, the far-right parties have common characteristics, such as their emphasis on nationalism, anti-migration, scepticism towards the EU, and their anti-establishment rhetoric.

Contemporary far-right parties mostly have Eurosceptic positions, especially since the beginning of the 21st century (McDunnell and Werner, 2018, pp. 749). Their level and type of scepticism towards the EU have been transformed especially after Brexit. After the Brexit referendum in 2016, firstly several far-right parties suggested a similar exit referendum from the EU for their countries. However, their rhetoric mostly shifted especially before the 2019 European elections. They mostly started to emphasise that they would become more powerful in the EU institutions and transform the EU into a ‘Europe of nations’ (Öner, 2022).

As Mudde (2019) argues, the strengthening of the far-right is the most visible aspect of the fundamental transformation of European politics. The European elections in 2019 reflected how much the far-right became mainstreamed and normalized. Although these parties are Eurosceptic, they use the European level to increase their visibility and legitimacy by being part of a political group in the EP. They have been financially supported by the EU as well. Their crucial political figures, such as Marine Le Pen increased their visibility and popularity while serving as MEPs (Janssen, 2016, p. 6).

On the other hand, the cooperation between far-right parties in the EP had been much more limited than other party groups (Mudde, 2007). However, in recent years they have

been collaborating much more with each other. There has been increasing rapprochement between far-right and centre-right as well, especially in terms of their migration policies.

The so-called 'migration crisis' provided a suitable atmosphere for far-right leaders to frame migration as a security threat. By adopting anti-immigrant discourse and policies, they have recently increased their visibility and influence in European politics, as reflected in the results of the regional, national and European elections. The main glue connecting the far-right parties at the European level is their anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies, particularly 'securitization of migration', especially after the migration crisis. The governing mainstream parties have also securitized migration as a 'relevant' threat to increase or maintain their votes to cope with the rising influence of the far-right. They have usually copied the discourse and policies of the far-right on migration (Ünal Eriş and Öner, 2021, pp. 187-188). However, the voters mostly prefer the original instead of its copy.

The main common issue for the far-right parties is opposition to migration politically (insecurity), economically (re-distribution of resources), and culturally (fear of Islamization) (Ünal Eriş and Öner, 2021). After the migration crisis, mainstream parties, particularly centre-right parties have increasingly defined immigration as a threat to national identity and security as well (Mudde, 2019, p. 28).

The discourse of 'new Europe' has come to the fore, especially after the elections in the Netherlands in November 2023, in which Geert Wilder's PVV won the elections. To congratulate Wilders, the leader of the League, Matteo Salvini tweeted (November 22, 2023): "Congratulations to my friend Wilders, historical ally of the Lega, leader of the PVV, on this extraordinary election victory. A 'new Europe' is possible..."

In this chapter, firstly the idea of a ‘new Europe’ of the far-right is discussed. Instead of leaving the EU, most of the far-right leaders have emphasised the goal of ‘Europe of Nations’, especially since the 2019 European elections. Secondly the influential factors for collaboration between the far-right parties before the 2024 European elections will be evaluated. On the one hand, the migration issue brings together the far-right parties, especially after the ‘migration crisis’, which led to rising ‘securitization of migration’ and ‘externalization of the EU migration management’. On the other hand, their foreign policy orientations after Russia invaded Ukraine and their relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, are the main dividing lines of the far-right parties before the 2024 European elections. In addition to these, it will influence the rapprochement between the centre-right and far-right as well. Lastly, the implications of the result of the European elections and the challenges of the ‘new Europe’ vision of the far-right for the future of the EU will be discussed.

1. European Elections and Competing Visions of Europe

European identity has been under construction process throughout history and under the reconstruction process within the institutional framework of the EU since the end of the Second World War (Öner, 2011). Contemporary Europe relies on constant negotiations between competing ‘parochial’ and ‘universalistic’ visions of Europe (Buhari Gülmez and Rumford, 2016). Various visions of Europe which were put forward by Buhari Gülmez and Gülmez (2020) are still competing in the EU. The main competition is going on between ‘Global Europe’ and ‘Parochial Europe’ especially after Russia invades Ukraine. *Parochial Europe* refers to ‘Europe of Nations’,

“unmaking European integration and transforming Europe along (micro)nationalist lines” and *Global Europe* refers to “blurring the boundaries between European and global visions, thus remaking Europe along universalistic lines”.

Thus, many Europes co-exist, interact, influence, and clash with each other during the reconstruction process of European identity. This especially occurs in times of crises, which may be perceived as ‘critical junctures’. This ‘polycrisis’ has made the clashes between different visions of Europe more visible (Buhari Gülmez and Gülmez, 2020). After Russia invaded Ukraine and with the EU’s increasing focus on its security and defence policy, the Global Europe vision has become more predominant.

The ‘securitization of migration’ and construction of immigrants, especially non-European immigrants, as the main ‘other’ have brought the far-right parties together, especially since the migration crisis. Mudde (2007) argues that the common ideological characteristics of populist radical right parties are nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, a strong state, traditional ethics, and revisionism.

The European vision of the far-right may be defined as ‘Parochial Europe’. The far-right parties started to focus on the goal of constructing a ‘Europe of nations’ (Öner, 2022) after the Brexit process. Most of the far-right parties do not prefer to leave the EU anymore, rather they want to have a stronger presence and influence at the EU institutions and transform it (Kundnani, 2023). However, the AfD is an outlier in this respect. Thus, the far-right has been mainly moving from hard Euroscepticism to softer Euroscepticism.

The supporters of Parochial Europe are usually in favour of restrictive migration policies and a fragmented Europe where nation-states are the dominant actors. In addition to these, the

supporters of Parochial Europe usually resort to xenophobia and Islamophobia.

European elections have provided far-right parties with an additional level to increase their public visibility and mobilize more voters. European election campaigns also give these parties a higher share of media coverage which is disproportionate to their national electoral weight (Almeida, 2010, pp. 243-244).

The first indicator of transnational cooperation among far-right parties goes back to the Eurodroite group of 1979 which was a temporary alliance between the French *Parti des Forces Nouvelles* and the *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI). However, the MSI was the only party which could be represented at the EP and they could not form a political group. Rather than incompatible nationalisms or ideological differences, the challenges for transnational cooperation lie in constraints at the domestic level, despite their strongly centralized organizations (Almeida, 2010, pp. 244-247).

Salvini with his ally Marine Le Pen founded the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group which was the most right-wing and Eurosceptic one at the EP in 2015 (Raos, 2018, p. 118). Both Salvini and Le Pen increasingly view the EU as an area in which to advance their respective agendas (*Global Risk Insights*, 2019).

As Almeida (2010) argues, because of the inability of the far-right to form sustainable coalitions in the EP, the potential for Europeanization through cross-national coalition-building remains limited. He added that there was a low degree of Europeanization in terms of their influence in European policy-making as well. Their main strong influence is based on their agenda-setting capability. Especially since the 2019 European elections, the interaction and collaboration between far-right parties have increased while their influence in European politics has increased as well.

2. *Rising Influence of Far-Right at 2019 European Elections*

The contestation between many Europes came to the fore during the European election campaign in 2019 (Öner, 2022). For instance, especially after Brexit, Salvini emphasized the goal of transforming Europe and “taking back Italian sovereignty” instead of leaving the EU. These parties mostly believe that they may have a more suitable atmosphere to realise their nationalist goals within the loose institutional framework of the EU. Thus, the rhetoric and goal of far-right leaders have been revised as transforming the EU by having a stronger presence and influence in the EU institutions and giving back more sovereignty to the member states.

These parties have selectively securitized migration according to their national concerns and their timing of securitization differs as well. For instance, while NR has been nativist and securitized migration from the beginning, the League and AfD have securitized migration after the migration crisis. These parties have securitized especially non-European and Muslim immigrants. The League has usually securitized African immigrants, especially Salvini referred to their migration as an ‘invasion’ and visualized them as arriving on boats across the Mediterranean, as was frequently shared on his and the League’s social media accounts (Ünal Eriş and Öner, 2021). The securitization of migration was one of the main issues that brought together the far-right parties which influence the rhetoric and migration policies of mainstream parties as well.

Before the European elections in May 2019, *Lega* had developed closer interactions with the other far-right parties, especially the NR and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV). On 21 January 2017, the leaders of Western Europe’s far-right parties met in Koblenz, Germany to fight against the EU’s ‘neoliberal’ doctrines (Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017, p. 635).

At the 2019 European elections, the European Peoples Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) lost their combined parliamentary majority for the first time in EU history (Mudde, 2019).

A party group must have at least 23 MEPs from 7 member states. MEPs from Le Pen and Salvini's parties joined forces with other anti-immigration parties to create the biggest far-right group in the EP to replace the ENF which includes the League, National Rally, AfD, FPÖ, Belgium's Flemish Interest (*Vlaams Belang*), Finland's True Finns (PS), and Czechia's Freedom and Direct Democracy (*Deutsche Welle*, 2019). This group became the fifth largest group in the EP. ID increased its presence from 5% of MEPs in 2014 to 10% in 2019. According to Marine Le Pen, although opinions within the ID differ on some issues, there is a consensus on major issues like migration and preventing the spread of Islam in Europe. The ID group was led by Marco Zanni, an MEP from the *Lega* who stated that it was important for all parties with a 'radically different view of Europe' to join forces (*The Guardian*, June 13, 2019). In his victory speech after winning the European elections in 2019, Salvini stated that "not only is the *Lega* the first party in Italy, but also Marine Le Pen is the first party in France... It is the sign of a Europe that is changing" (*The Guardian*, May 29, 2019).

On the other hand, one of the main dividing lines between European far-right parties is their foreign policy approach and their relationship with Putin. Many far-right leaders in Europe, such as Marine Le Pen and Salvini have had close ties with Putin. After Russia invaded Ukraine, the foreign policies of the far-right parties have become one of the main controversial issues before the 2024 European elections.

Before Russia invaded Ukraine, Le Pen claimed that she didn't believe that Russia would invade Ukraine. She added that if she was the President of France, instead of Macron, the

relations with Russia would be much better (*Newsweek*, 2022). After Russia invaded Ukraine, because French public opinion was mostly supportive of Ukraine, Le Pen changed her rhetoric and condemned the invasion. Moreover, Le Pen had to abolish millions of campaign brochures for the 2022 national elections which include photos of her shaking hands with Putin in Kremlin (*Independent*, March 2, 2022). Although Le Pen has been using anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies against especially Muslim and non-European immigrants, she shifted her rhetoric towards Ukrainian asylum seekers after Russia invaded Ukraine.

3. Binding and Dividing Factors for European Far-Right and Mainstreaming of Far-Right Before 2024 European Elections

One of the biggest common denominators among European far-right parties is their anti-immigrant policies, especially towards non-European and Muslim irregular immigrants. On the other hand, the main dividing issue for far-right parties is their foreign and security policy priorities. While some political figures like Salvini and Le Pen had close ties with Putin, some like Meloni have a more Atlanticist approach to foreign policy. Even those, who have been closer to Putin before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, after the invasion, have tried to put a distance and they have shifted their anti-migration attitude towards Ukrainian asylum seekers as well.

Wagner and Meyer found strong evidence for accommodation by mainstream parties and little evidence for moderation of far-right parties. There has been a movement towards the right in European party systems in the last decades. Moreover, the mainstream and the far-right have shifted towards greater

authoritarianism and the far-right has been more than the mainstream (Wagner and Meyer, 2017, p. 86).

The centre-right by including the far-right as a coalition partner or as a support party has put an end to a situation in which far-right votes were wasted. In Western Europe, the collaboration between far-right and centre right started in Austria (Bale, 2010, pp. 69-70). In recent years especially after the recent Italian coalition government under the leadership of Giorgia Meloni, participation of far-right in coalition governments has become more normalised.

The mainstreaming of far-right rhetoric and policies can be seen in European elections as well, specifically in the election manifestos of the EPP. Mickenberg argues that “instead of a mainstreaming of the radical right, we observe a radicalization of the mainstream” (Minkenberg, 2013, pp. 53-67). For instance, in EPP’s election manifesto for the 2014 European elections, “controlling immigration into Europe to ensure internal security” was part of its proposals. While its 2019 manifesto, which was influenced by the far-right agenda, focused on “Europe that preserves our ways”, and particularly mentioned ‘illegal immigration’ and ‘radical Islam’ as fundamental threats to Europe (Mudde, 2019, pp. 29-30).

In 2019 Ursula von der Leyen was elected as European Commission President with the help of *Fidesz*, which remained in the EPP for a very long time, although it has gradually adopted far-right party characteristics (*The European Conservative*, 2024).

The far-right groups at the EP are divided. The ECR defines itself as ‘Eurorealists’. The ID group had MEPs mostly from National Rally, the League and the AfD. They emphasised “the Greek-Roman and Christian heritage as the pillars of European civilisation” (*ID Group Statute*). They are in favour of “cooperation between sovereign European nations, and therefore reject any further evolution toward a European superstate... They

oppose any new transfer of power from the nations to the EU” (*ID Group Statute*). Their main difference is that the members of the ID mostly have close ties with Putin and they are critical towards NATO. On the other hand, the EPP is the biggest party family at the EP. One of the common characteristics of these three parties was their cultural perception of European identity, focusing on Christianity, Roman heritage, while EPP is different because of being in favour of further European integration and they are not nativist.

The Russia-Ukraine war triggered a crucial transformation of the EU and its member states as well, especially in terms of their security and defence policies. For instance, formerly neutral Finland became a member of NATO and the far-right Finns Party decided to leave ID and move to the ECR. In the party statement, it was stated that ‘radical change in Finland’s security policy’ caused by Russia’s war on Ukraine led the party to “re-examine international cooperation networks” (*YLE News*, 2023). Thus, one of the main issues that affect the collaboration between far-right parties before the 2024 European elections was the Russia-Ukraine war and these parties’ relations with Putin.

Thus, we have seen the ‘normalisation’ of far-right, meanwhile the ‘radicalisation of centre-right’. We have also seen the rising normalisation of far-right and centre right coalitions as well. These political tendencies at the national level may have implications at the European level too. As the leader of the biggest far-right coalition in Western Europe, Meloni has already started her attempts to increase collaboration with the centre-right parties across Europe. For instance, she met at the beginning of September 2023 with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis to collaborate to fight against irregular migration towards Europe. She has been also a pioneer actor in Europe in terms of externalisation of migration management as well by

collaborating with neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and Albania. The far-right and populist right coalition government of Meloni may accelerate mainstreaming of far-right, normalization of far-right and centre-right coalitions and radicalization of centre-right in European politics as well.

4. Conclusion

Since the migration crisis, the far-right parties have moved from the margins to the mainstream of European politics. Their party manifestos and their leaders' speeches declare their opposition to immigrants and refugees, particularly those who are culturally different, and perceived as threatening jobs, social benefits, security, culture and the lifestyle of the natives. Their anti-immigrant rhetoric has pushed these issues on the agenda across Europe (Sarkar, 2019, pp. 170-174).

Kundnani (2023) argues that "we tend to idealise the EU as an inherently progressive or even cosmopolitan project, making it seemingly incompatible with far-right thinking." He puts forward that the far right in Europe does not only speak on behalf of the nation against Europe, but also on of a 'different kind of imagined community' and focuses on a 'threatened European civilisation'. The far-right parties have the goal of making a 'far-right EU' which would return power to member states. The far-right parties seem to cooperate to reach their common goals, particularly they try to transform the EU migration policy. Especially after the far-right-populist conservative coalition in Italy, we have seen increasingly "the convergence between the pro-European centre-right and the Eurosceptic far-right" (Kundnani, 2023).

After the Russia-Ukraine war, the Global Europe vision has become more predominant in the EU. However, the elections

in France and Italy (2022), the Netherlands (2023) and Austria (2024) reflected that 'Parochial Europe' is still the biggest competitor to this vision.

The negative socio-economic impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war on Europe, particularly rising inflation rates, energy and housing prices were influential on the result of the 2024 European elections. If these problems cannot be solved or at least decreased by the mainstream parties in power, the far-right parties, especially those which are currently in opposition may benefit more from this conjuncture.

For instance, after the recent changes in the retirement age in France, there had been long demonstrations. If these socio-economic problems cannot be solved, there is a risk of further rise of Le Pen's party NR.

It is still unclear which vision of Europe will be predominant in the EU. The competition between many Europes has been going on. In recent years there has been further emphasis on European cultural identity and protection of European civilisation especially after the migration crisis. On the other hand, the EU has been transforming into a 'Geopolitical Europe', especially since Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

As a result, to what extent the challenges of irregular migration, energy and housing prices will be overcome, the demands of the farmers will be met will influence the level of success of the far-right. In addition to these, the position of far-right parties especially in France and Germany and other members of the EU and the level of cooperation between the far-right and the centre-right will influence which vision of Europe will be predominant in the future.

If the far-right becomes stronger, this may primarily lead to further securitization and externalization in EU migration policy. Moreover, it may challenge the implementation process of the measures towards reaching the goals of the Green Deal as

well. In addition to these, the results of the American elections have also influenced the role of far-right in European politics as well. It has increased the self-confidence of far-right and its further normalization in global politics. Consequently, the results of the European elections reflected how European politics have been transforming after this ‘polycrisis’ in the last decades and rising influence of far-right in European politics.

References

- Almeida, D. (2010) *Europeanized Eurosceptics? Radical Right Parties and European Integration. Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 11(3).
- Bale, T. (2010) *Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe’s Bipolarising Party Systems. West European Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380312331280598>.
- Brunazzo, M., & Gilbert, M. (2017) *Insurgents against Brussels: Euro-scepticism and the Right-wing Populist Turn of the Lega Nord since 2013. Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 22(5).
- Buhari Gülmez, D., & Gülmez, S. (2020) *Europe in Crises: Europe’s Others and Other Europes from a Global Perspective*. In Axford, B., et al. (Eds.) *Political Sociologies of the Cultural Encounter: Essays on Borders, Cosmopolitanism and Globalization*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Buhari Gülmez, D., & Rumford, C. (2016) *Towards a (‘Thick’, ‘Thin’ or ‘Parallel’) European Society? Understanding the Dynamics of European Multiplicity. Innovation: European Journal of Social Science Research*, 29(1).
- Deutsche Welle (2019) *Far-Right Parties Form New Group in EP*, 14 June 2019. <https://euobserver.com/institutional/143963> (Accessed: 12 September 2019).
- ECR Official website (2023) <https://ecrgroup.eu/ecr> (Accessed: 18 April 2023).

Givens, Terri E. (2005) *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Global Risk Insights (2019) *Italy after the EP Elections: The Populists Prevail*. <https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/06/italy-after-the-european-parliament-elections-the-populists-prevail/> (Accessed: 30 January 2020).

ID Group Statute, https://assets.nationbuilder.com/idgroup/pages/54/attachments/original/1673443377/NEW_ID_Statutes__EN_11.2022.pdf?1673443377 (Accessed: 18 November 2022).

Independent (2022) *Marine Le Pen's Far Right Party Orders 1.2 Million Election Leaflets Showing Her with Putin to be Binned*. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/france-elections-le-pen-putin-b2025791.html> (Accessed: 28 May 2022).

Janssen, T. (2016) *A Love-Hate Relationship Far-Right Parties and The European Union*. Brussels: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.

Kundnani, H. (2023) *A Far-right EU?* IPS Journal. <https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/democracy-and-society/a-far-right-eu-6854/> (Accessed: 28 May 2022).

McDonnell, D., & Werner, A. (2018) *Respectable Radicals: Why Some Radical Right Parties in the EP Forsake Policy Congruence*. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(5).

Minkenberg, M. (2013) *From Pariah to Policy Maker? The Radical Right in Europe, West and East: Between Margin and Mainstream*. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 21(1).

Mudde, C. (2019) *Why Copying the Populist Right isn't Going to Save the Left*. The Guardian, 1 June 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/may/14/why-copying-the-populist-right-isnt-going-to-save-the-left> (Accessed: 29 July 2019).

Mudde, C. (2019) *The Far Right May Not Have Cleaned Up, But Its Influence Now Dominates Europe*. The Guardian, 28 May 2019.

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/28/far-right-european-electionseu-politic> (Accessed: 12 September 2019).

Mudde, C. (2013) *Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?* *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(1).

Mudde, C. (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Newsweek (2022) *What Marine Le Pen Has Said about Vladimir Putin*, 19 April 2022. <https://www.newsweek.com/what-marine-le-pen-said-about-vladimir-putin-friend-admirer-1698984> (Accessed: 28 June 2022).

Oesch, D., & Rennwald, L. (2018) *Electoral Competition in Europe's New Tripolar Political Space: Class Voting for the Left, Centre-right and Radical Right*. *European Journal of Political Research*, 57.

Öner, S. (2022) *Europe of Populist Radical Right and the Case of Lega of Salvini: Pioneer of a Parochial Europe?* *European Politics and Society*, 23(1).

Öner, S. (2011) *Turkey and the European Union: The Question of European Identity*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.

Raos, V. (2018) *From Pontida to Brussels: The Nationalization and Europeanization of the Northern League*. *Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva: časopis za politologiju*, 15(1).

Sarkar, B. (2019) *The Right Matters in European Politics*, in *Challenges in Europe* (Ed.) Gulshan Sachdeva, Cham: Springer Publishing.

The European Conservative, (2024) *PM Orban Indicates Willingness to Join Conservative ECR Group in EP*, 2 February 2024. <https://european-conservative.com/articles/news/pm-orban-indicates-willingness-to-join-conservative-ecr-group-in-european-parliament/?print-posts=print> (Accessed: 18 April 2024).

The Guardian (2019) *Brexit Party in Talks to Join Far-Right Group in European Parliament*, 29 May 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/29/brexit-party-said-talks-to-join-far-right-group-in-eu-parliament> (Accessed: 18 September 2019).

Ünal Eriş, Ö., & Öner, S. (2021) *Securitization of Migration and The Rising Influence of Populist Radical Right Parties at 2019 European Parliament Elections*. *Ankara Review of European Studies*, 20(1).

Wagner, M., & Meyer, T.M. (2017) *The Radical Right as Niche Parties? The Ideological Landscape of Party Systems in Western Europe, 1980-2014*. *Political Studies Association*, 65.

YLE News (2023) *Finns Party Returns to Right-wing ECR Group in EU Parliament*, 5 May 2023. <https://yle.fi/a/74-20026075> (Accessed: 8 July 2023).

Zaslove, A. (2004) *The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right*. *European Integration*, 26(1).